PEOPLE POWER REVOLT
RABBA NAGA - GUIDANCE ON THE UTILIZATION OF PEOPLE POWER IN RESISTANCE
DEAR COMRADES,
I saw young people yesterday, 28/9/2015 demonstrating at Parliament demanding reforms in the electoral process. While this is a commendable exercise, it is NOT CORRECT in terms of tactics.
You see an army should never attack when it is not ready
2- an army should never attack for publicity unless you are a mere terrorist with no desire to win the fight
3- an army should never attack on enemy's provocation. Yes you can defend your forces but be careful when doing this.
4- an army should never attack in an uncoordinated manner.
5- never attack to remain relevant politically.
I will give other instances when one should never use his forces,
All the above are important for the following reasons;
1- every time you attack when you are not ready and you are defeated, you affect the morale of the troops
2- you deplete the ranks and file unnecessarily and once you start losing fighters in uncoordinated SKERMISHES, you lose the war of numbers and degrade the command element.
3- you actually build the enemy profile as he defeats you not because he is superior BUT BECAUSE YOU ARE NOT READY.
4- you lose credibility as a commander
5- it is immoral for a commander to utilise a force of any kind in useless attack which you launch for selfish reasons.
The moral of this is that life of your fighters is sacrosanct and should be protected at all costs and only expended in planned and well thought out engagements.
It is easy to tell a force which will win or lose from the above.
I will not go into the specifics here because it may aid the enemy, but suffice to state that when you go on the street when you are not ready or when your reasons for doing so are not well thought out and therefore it is a one or two off, the big politicians are arrested and then released, but the young fighters are kept in jails, some are killed and others maimed.
Why do we sacrifice these? It weakens you and strengthens the oppressor.
Let me give you one illustration near home. Of course there are many other examples world over but here we go:
When those people of Museveni and Kayiira went to the bush, they employed different strategies and tactics. And as they say, as to who won and who lost is history.
UFM of Kayiira attacked Luzira prison on 27th December 1980. Museveni group went on 6th February 1981. Kayiira's strategy was to generate as much publicity so as to get political capital and get funding. But also for vanity, ie not to be called weak!
But the Museveni group was guided by the desire to build capacity and protect their forces as much as possible.
And two examples demonstrate this;
NRA went into what you can refer to as the strategic concealment phase. Actually they spent the entire 1981 in hiding. They did not have enough arms nor personnel. So they went in forests and armed quietly and trained.
The situation in UFM on the other hand was different. They expended the little ammunitions etc in urban attacks to generate publicity and put little emphasis in planning, training and improving command and control.
And while Gadhafi gave NRA about 100 guns in 1981, he gave UFM 743 guns in 1982. These guns came first and the ammunition was to follow in two to three months.
To UFM leaders, this was too long and they decided to attack Lubiri barracks in 1982- they went with empty guns and expected to use the little they had to storm the barracks, capture the ammunition from UNLA armouries and overrun the city and take Kampala. By the way, if they had waited for three months, got the ammunition, bombs etc which were now on the way, Kayiira could have ended the war in 1982.
What happened? UNLA had got wind pf the attack. They removed the ammunition and took it to Mbuya. And indeed UFM gallantly attacked Lubiri barracks, raided the armouries but found nothing!
Result! Total defeat of UFM as a force. Its army commander Currently Brig Hussein Adda of UPDF now, its chief of staff, now Col. Mark Kodil, and entire command of UFM, save Nkwanga, Ndugute and Kasirye survived to form FEDEMO! Kayiira himself was to withdraw to Washington! All their guns were captured save for the 200 which Lutaaya Sonko (RIP) drove and gave to NRA in Bulemeezi! It is these guns that helped NRA even have the capacity to attack Masindi in 1984! Forget the posturing of Mr Museveni!
As they say, war is 55% luck! But you can’t take it away from Museveni, he utilised the correct strategy and tactics. And the reality is, NRA won the war and UFM was destroyed.
Therefore the question of strategy and tactics is of crucial importance. It must be grasped by leaders.
Civil disobedience is a war of another kind that must be planned, well-coordinated and well timed.
It is not just walking the streets and shouted, it is more serious than that and even more lethal against dictators.
But it is no guess work. You plan it as you plan any serious resistance. The leaders who don’t understand this undermine the struggle, not deliberately definitely, but they do all the same.
Therefore those USELESS SKIRMISHES IN THE CITY MUST STOP. They work for the enemy and weaken the PEOPLE's STRUGGLE.
I implore leaders to go to work and build capacity, coordinate with other friendly forces, build command, plan logistics eg food for the families, first aid etc for the young people who face the danger, etc etc! If you do these, you will win. Don’t send boys and girls on the street just to remain politically relevant. What the people of Uganda want is victory.
May God Bless our struggle
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